This book describes a single year in a long war. By October 1966 the American troop buildup in Vietnam, which had begun eighteen months earlier, had reached a point where the war effort could move beyond simply defending South Vietnam. For the first time, General William C. Westmoreland had enough arms and men to take the initiative from the enemy. He believed that the next twelve months would show significant progress on all fronts. There would be no quick victory, however. Westmoreland understood that he faced a prolonged war of attrition, one that would test the Army's abilities and America's staying power. Well aware of American intentions, North Vietnam stepped up the infiltration of its own troops into the South, aiming to wage its own war of attrition to force the United States out of the conflict. While the insurgency in the South remained the cornerstone of Communist strategy, it was increasingly overshadowed by main force military operations. These circumstances set the stage for intensified combat. How well both sides fared during this year is the subject of this volume.