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Prisoners' Rights: The Supreme Court and Evolving Standards of Decency
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Barnes and Noble
Prisoners' Rights: The Supreme Court and Evolving Standards of Decency
Current price: $95.00
Barnes and Noble
Prisoners' Rights: The Supreme Court and Evolving Standards of Decency
Current price: $95.00
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Prisoners' rights is an area of constitutional law that is often overlooked. Combining an historical and strategic analysis, this study describes the doctrinal development of the constitutional rights of prisoners from the pre-Warren Court period through the current Rehnquist Court. Like many provisions in the Bill of Rights, the meaning of the Eighth Amendment's language on cruel and unusual punishment and the scope of prisoners' rights have been influenced by prevailing public opinion, interest group advocacy, and—most importantly—the ideological values of the nine individuals who sit on the Supreme Court. These variables are incorporated in a strategic analysis of judicial decision making in an attempt to understand the constitutional development of rights in this area.
Fliter examines dozens of cases spanning 50 years and provides a systematic analysis of strategic interaction on the Supreme Court. His results support the notion that justices do not simply vote their policy preferences; some seek to influence their colleagues and the broader legal community. In many cases there was evidence of strategic interaction in the form of voting fluidity, substantive opinion revisions, dissents from denial of certiorari, and lobbying to form a majority coalition. The analysis reaches beyond death penalty cases and includes noncapital cases arising under the Eighth Amendment, habeas corpus petitions, conditions of confinement cases, and due process claims.
Fliter examines dozens of cases spanning 50 years and provides a systematic analysis of strategic interaction on the Supreme Court. His results support the notion that justices do not simply vote their policy preferences; some seek to influence their colleagues and the broader legal community. In many cases there was evidence of strategic interaction in the form of voting fluidity, substantive opinion revisions, dissents from denial of certiorari, and lobbying to form a majority coalition. The analysis reaches beyond death penalty cases and includes noncapital cases arising under the Eighth Amendment, habeas corpus petitions, conditions of confinement cases, and due process claims.