This book suggests an airpower theory that helps explain why airpower does not result in quick, clean, economical, "ideal war. The novelty of this theory stems from the graphic analogy of the four forces that act upon an aircraft in flight. The theory suggests that technology is the "thrust that propels airpower towards ideal war by generating the "lift of improved effects. The "drag of resource constraints and "weight or "gravity of enemy technology and counter-tactics work in opposition and drag airpower from ideal towards real war. A review of three major airpower advocates, William Mitchell, Giulio Douhet, and John Warden, sets a foundation for how airpower advocates have developed ideas, concepts, and theory about airpower's future capabilities. Three case studies, the B-17, free-fall nuclear bomb, and F-22A fighter, trace how airpower advocacy led to technology that would enable ideal war. In each case, application of the Four Forces theory demonstrates that while resource constraints and enemy technology and counter-tactics prevent ideal war, airpower technology improves the character of war as a whole.